The Logic of Foreclosure: Tie-In Doctrine after Fortner v. U.S. Steel by unknown
Notes and Comments
The Logic of Foreclosure: Tie-In Doctrine
after Fortner v. U.S. Steel
The Supreme Court has long held tying arrangements-sales of one
product conditioned upon purchase of another-illegal per se under
the Sherman Act' whenever the seller "has sufficient economic control
with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competi-
tion in the market for the tied product."' Economists have sharply
criticized the Supreme Court cases developing the prohibition.3 These
commentators have occasionally disclaimed concern "with the develop-
ment of the law of tie-ins as such" 4 and have often proceeded without
adequate exposition of the Court's rationale.5 This Note describes that
rationale-a notion that it is unfair to foreclose competitors in one
market through the use of power developed in another market-and
develops its economic and legal implications. Other economic effects
of tie-ins, such as effects on market structure or consumer welfare, ap.
pear thus far to have had little influence on the Court's decisions and
are here treated only peripherally.
Judicial policy against tie-ins found its first expression in a series of
patent infringement cases in which the Court was presented with peti-
tioners who sold patented machinery subject to the condition that other
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). This note interprets Sherman Act tying doctrine as sufficiently
broad to justify ignoring any purported distinctions between the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). See pp. 89, 90 infra.
2. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). The tying product Is a
product which A may obtain only if A agrees also to purchase the tied product. The tied
product, however, may usually be purchased without an agreement to take the tying
product. Where neither product is available separately, each product is both tying and
tied.
The requirement that a "not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce" in the tied
product be affected, Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958), is no longer
a check on the scope of the prohibition, but serves only as a de minimis requirement.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 US. 495, 501 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALn LJ.
19 (1957); Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE LJ. 1907
(1967).
4. Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. L. RLv. 626, 627 nA
(1965).
5. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 3, at 19-20; Markovits, supra note 3, at 1398.
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goods be purchased for use with the patented machine.0 The Court
refused to enjoin buyers from using alternatives to the tied good, since
to do so would encourage attempts to avoid the fundamental govern-
ment policy of limiting the economic power of a patentee to the mar-
ket for the patented good itself. The Clayton Act's prohibition against
sales conditioned on refusals to deal with the seller's competitors was
cited, but only as an expression of the public policy which prevented
the Court from extending equitable relief to the seller.7
In the first Sherman Act tying agreement case, International Salt v.
United States,8 the Court was again faced with a patented tying
product, a machine which added salt to canned goods. Lessees of these
machines were required to purchase from the lessor the salt used in the
machines. The Court affirmed summary judgment and an injunction
against enforcement of the lease provisions, holding it illegal per se to
"foreclose competitors from any substantial market."' 0 The Court
relied on Judge Learned Hand's Second Circuit opinion in Fashion
Originators Guild v. FTC," a case in which the FTC successfully en-
joined a combination of dress manufacturers from directly coercing
retailers into refusing to sell competing dresses. Hand's opinion stresses
the foreclosure of competing manufacturers, noting that competition
between the conspirators was probably sufficient to "keep prices as low
and as wayward as they were before."'-'
The International Salt opinion did not discuss economic power in
the tying market. The Court upheld the trial court's refusal to hear
evidence offered by the defendant, and uncontradicted by the govern-
ment, that other salt dispensing machines were readily available sub-
stitutes for the defendant's patented machines.' 3 The only evidence of
6. See Mfercoid Corp. v. Alinneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 US. 680 (1944);
Mfercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 US. 661 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. GS.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co,
243 U.S. 502 (1917).
7. 'Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517-18 (1917).
8. 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (unanimous as to violation).
9. The Court discussed the patent infringement cases and the patent in the pre-ent
case only to note that the patent did not take the case beyond the reach of the normal
prohibition. 332 U.S. at 395-96.
10. 332 U.S. at 396. The case introduced the concept of a not insubstantial volume
of business affected, but apparently only in connection with the per se rule derived from
Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 US. 457 (1941).
11. 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aft'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
12. 114 F.2d at 84-85. Compare the Supreme Court opinion, which stressed tendency
to create monopoly, the limitations placed on retailers, and per se rules against boycotts.
312 U.S. at 464-65.
13. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 US. 1, 10 n.8 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 US. 293, 305 (1948). The availability of equivalent machines and the
lack of any meaningful monopoly conferred by the patent could hardly have been lost on
the seven members of the International Salt case who had earlier sat on Morton Salt Co.
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economic power of any kind over the tying product was that it was
patented and therefore could not be exactly duplicated by competitors.
International Salt and three decisions which followed shortly there-
after' seemed to indicate that the economic power required to make a
tie-in illegal was merely whatever the Court felt would "appreciably
restrain" the tied market. As far as the cases showed, that requirement
would be met in the case of any differentiated product-one that gave
some basis for some buyers to prefer it over others. There was dicta
concerning "monopoly in the popular sense,"15 but on the facts before
the Court little real economic power had been proven in any of the
cases.
A very different interpretation of past cases was put forth by Justice
v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 483 (1942), which involved a machine patented by a competi-
tor that performed the same function as the machine in International Salt.
14. In United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), the Court reversed a trial court's
refusal to enjoin a collective buying agreement by movie exhibitors by which they bought
movies from distributors subject to contracts which limited the access by their competltors
to first and second-run films. The Court analyzed the defendants' power to gain such
favorable and restrictive contracts as a function of the buying group's ownerahip of
theatres in a number of towns where there were no competing theatres. Mr. Justice
Douglas's analogy to the tie-in cases reveals that he saw foreclosure of competitors as the
central evil in both tie-ins and in the present case and economic power as merely an
aggravating circumstance.
It is indeed "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial mar.
ket." International salt .... It follows a fortiori that the use of monopoly power,
however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage,
or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful.
Id. at 107. In fact, the Court had no findings on the record below that control of single.
theatre towns gave any substantial economic power over the decisions of nation-wide d1is.
tributors, and Mr. Justice Douglas admitted that a single "monopoly" town is a "feeble,
ineffective weapon." Id. On the same day as Griffith the Court, again per Air. Justice
Douglas, linked a Sherman Act prohibition more closely with the patent Infringement
cases. In United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), the Court affirmcd a
holding below that defendant motion-picture distributors had violated the Sherman Act
by, among other restraints, "block booking" or the refusal to license single feature movies
without an agreement by the exhibitor to license other features or groups of features.
This practice was felt to "prevent competitors from bidding for single features on their
individual merits," id. at 156-57, and to violate the public policy defended in the infringe.
ment cases. There was no evidence that the films were not economically interchangeable.
Exhibitors frequently leased films without taking opportunities to view them. Id. at
157-8 n.ll.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 US. 293 (1949), decided that Standard's reqlre.
ments contracts with its independent dealers were illegal when they bound 6.7% of
California dealers to Standard for periods of one year. The opinion by Justice Praiddutter
discussed International Salt.
That decision, at least as to contracts tying the sale of a nonpatented to a patented
product, rejected the necessity of demonstrating economic consequences once It has
been established that "the volume of business affected" is not "insignificant or
insubstantial" and that the effect of the contract is to "foreclose competitors from
[a] substantial market."
Id. at 304. In this section and in dicta later, id. at 307-08, Frankfurter apparently interprets
International Salt to say that proof of economic power in the tied product is not a pre-
requisite to illegality of the tie-in but merely an aggravating factor that makes more
certain the "economic damage" that need not be proved.
15. United States v. Griffith, 334 US. 100, 106 (1948).
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Clark in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.0 Defendant,
owning the only morning paper and one of the two evening papers in
New Orleans, refused to sell advertising space in either paper singly.
The Supreme Court reversed a lower court holding that the practice
was a violation of the Sherman Act. After reviewing a series of cases,
none of which differentiated the Sherman and Clayton Act prohibitions
on tying arrangements,' 7 Justice Clark decided that Sherman Act-as
opposed to Clayton Act-violations were limited to "monopolists" in
the tying market who restrained a "substantial" volume of commerce
in the tied market.
From the "tying" cases a perceptible pattern of illegality emerges:
When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for
the "tying" product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the
tied product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the nar-
rower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because from
either factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is
inferred. And because for even a lawful monopolist it is "unrea-
sonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market," a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman
Act whenever both conditions are met.'8
The Court explicitly defined the relevant market of the tying product
-an exercise that had apparently been unnecessary in earlier tie-in
cases'g-as the total New Orleans market for general and classified
newspaper advertising. 20 The Court denied on two grounds that the
practice was an illegal tie-in under the Sherman Act. First, the Times-
16. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
17. Justice Clark discussed seven cases, 345 US. at 606-08. The first, FTC v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421, 426 (1920), is by his own account contrary to the "rule." United Shoe Mach. Co.
v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1922), and FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 US.
463, 474-75 (1923), are consistent with either or Justice Clark's rules, since both power
and restraint were found in the former and neither in the latter. Justice Clark's treatment
of International Business Mach. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135-36 (194), eems
to confirm the Clayton "either" rule but it gave weight to both power in the t)ing product
and substantial restraint in the tied product.
Clark's analysis of the Sherman Act cases would suggest that the Court in each cafe
found economic power in the tying product. In International Salt v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947), economic power is not even discussed, while the other two cases cited,
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1947), and United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100 (1948), provide no factual basis for finding real economic power. See note 14
supra. Cf. Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 82 (1940). Clark finds no firmer
basis for the economic power requirement than by arguing that tcie Court had considered
patents and copyrights as equivalents of economic dominance, -345 US. at 611 & n.0,
and by taking quotations badly out of context, compare 345 U.S. at 609 n26 with United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
18. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
19. And likewise avoided in later cases. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 US.
38, 45 n.4 (1962).
20. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610-12 & n.31 (1953).
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Picayune's forty per cent of that total market was not "dominance" as
required in the Court's per se rule. Second, the arrangement was not a
case of "tying" at all, since morning and evening advertising are the
"selfsame product."21
In Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States22 and United States v.
Loew's Inc.,23 the opinions of Justices Black and Goldberg limited
Times-Picayune to its immediate facts24 and continued the develop-
ment of Sherman Act tie-in law along lines more consistent with In-
ternational Salt. A superficial similarity to Clark's rule in Times-
Picayune remained, but the new statement linked rather than
dichotomized tying market power and tied market restraint.
Tying agreements . . . are unreasonable in and of themselves
whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the tied
product and a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce
is affected.2 5
By stating the power requirement as "sufficient . . . to appreciably
restrain," Black effectively glossed over Clark's insistence on a showing
of "dominance" in the tying market.2 If a significant amount of trade
in the tied product is restrained by the tie, it follows that the tying
power is sufficient to restrain it. Direct proof of "dominance" or
"economic control," or even of the extent of the tying market, is,
according to Justice Goldberg, "seldom ... necessary," since leverage
sufficient to restrain the tied market is said to follow from "the tying
product's desirability to consumers or from the uniqueness of its
attributes." 28 Both Justices Black and Goldberg noted that this ap-
21. Id. at 612-14. The government did not rely on the Clayton Act, id. 609, but the
Court's reasoning as to the absence of different products would clearly also make that Act
inapplicable. Since there were cost efficiency reasons for the unit pricing and since the
competing paper's share of the market had declined only 3% in ten years, the Court found
no unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 617-23.
In a short dissenting opinion, four judges took the position that tie illegality of the
tie-in depended not upon the Times-Picayune's share of the entire newspaper advertising
market, but rather on the paper's monopoly of the distinct sub-product morning advertis-
ing space. Since this monopoly could be used to increase the paper's share in tie related
sub-product markets, the tie was impermissible. 345 U.S. at 628.
22. 356 US. 1 (1958).
23. 371 US. 38 (1962).
24. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 (1958).
25. Id. at 6.
26. And also eliminated any distinction between the Clayton and Sherman Acts, See
also Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 520.21 (1969)
(Fortas, J., dissenting).
27. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 nA (1962).
28. Id.
Vol. 79: 86, 1969
The Logic of Foreclosure
proach is consistent with the earlier patent tie-in cases: -3 the existence
of a patent gives rise to a presumption of uniqueness but certainly not
to an inference of monopolistic control of an entire market. Accord-
ingly, neither in Loew's nor in Northern Pacific did the Court require
careful definition of the tying market or proof of the extent of the
tying seller's share-in both cases "uniqueness" was enough30
The easing of the standard for economic power from Times-
Picayune's "dominance" to Loew's "uniqueness" can be understood as
reflecting the Court's perception of the dangers inherent in tying
arrangements,31 and an economic theory about the conditions sufficient
to produce those dangers. The Court has consistently maintained that
one of the evils of tying arrangements is that "buyers are forced to
forego their free choice between competing products" in the tied
market.32 On one level this statement is dearly nonsensical. In prin-
ciple, buyers always balance their desires for any product with its price.
With or without a tie-in, buyers can be forced to accept goods they
prefer less than others by the offering of a price differential which more
than compensates for the difference in attractiveness. Whatever the
buyer regards as burdens of the tie-in, whether low quality of the tied
good, inability to deal with preferred tied good sellers, or the risk in-
herent in being restricted to a given purchase in advance, these burdens
should be fully reflected in a decrease in what the buyer will pay for the
package. But this fact is so obvious, and has been brought to the Court's
attention so often over such a long period of time," that it must be
29. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 US. 58, 45-46 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 9-10 & n.8 (1958).
20. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 28, 45-48 (1962), held illegal the practice of
"block booking" of films in sales by distributors to television stations. The copyright on
the films and their variations "in theme, in artistic performance, in stars, in audience
appeal," 371 US. at 48, were relied on to establish distinctiveness. The Court did not
attempt to refute defendants' assertion that all types of television programming were
relatively interchangeable and that films constituted less than 8% of sud programming.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 256 U.S. 1. 7 (1958). while not enunciating a standaril
of uniqueness, affirmed a summary judgment injunction against enforcement of defendant's
contracts requiring that purchasers and lessees of Northern Pacific's land use the
railway to transport all products raised or manufactured thereon. The court below had
made no finding as to the extent of the market for land, nor of Northern Pacific's share of
that market, and the Supreme Court merely noted factors that made the land "prized" by
certain buyers. ,Members of the Times-Picayune majority dissented in Northem Pacific,
saying that a market determination was necessary. 256 U.S. at 12.
31. Mir. Justice Goldberg in United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 28, 4546 (1962), makes
it dear that he derived the uniqueness test from the power he felt necessary to create the
evils discussed infra.
32. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). See also Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 294 U.S. 495, 499, 502-04 (1969); United States v. Loew's
Inc., 371 U.S. S8, 45, 49 (1962); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 245 US.
594, 605-06 (1953).
33. This argument mas stated as early as 1917 by Mr. Justice Holmes in Motion Picture
Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519-20 (dissenting opinion). Since then
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presumed to have penetrated the judicial mind. Tie-in doctrine rests
on something more than a mistake in logic.
One basis fo the "restraint on buyer freedom" argument might
be the notion that even where the disadvantages of the tie are fully
reflected in a lower price, it is inconsistent with the idea of lib-
erty to allow the buyer to sell his freedom to make a separate choice
between competing tied products. Similarly, it might be felt that the
making of fragmented decisions on the quality of goods benefits the
community in terms of market allocations, and should not be bar-
gained away by the individual. 4 Further, even in transactions be-
tween merchants, not all preferences are adequately quantifiable;
and as transactions are made more complex, buyers are less able to
guarantee that all of their preferences are reflected in price,35
But the principal evil at which the doctrine is aimed is the use of
tying arrangements to deny competitors free access to the market for
the tied product.36 Though any seller forecloses his competitors from
the demand satisfied by the sale, and though the tying merchant can
foreclose his competitors only by the normal means of foregoing
profit, the tying arrangement may be different from other foreclo-
sures. The tying seller may be enabled effectively to cut prices in the
tied product as a result of his efficiencies in the production of the
tying product. The tied-market competitor can push his costs down
hardly an economic commentator has failed to make this point in one form or another.
See, e.g., Bork, Antitrust in Dubious Battle, FORTUNE, Sept. 1969 at 105; BowIan, Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-24 (1957); Pearson, Tying
Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. L. REv. 626, 633-34 (1965), The argument Is
also stated by Justice McKenna with respect to patent tie-ins in United States V. United
States Shoe Mach. Co., 247 US. 32, 65 (1918). Cf. United Shoe Mach, Co. v. United States,
258 U.S. 451, 462 (1922).
34. Cf. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 45 US. 594, 605 (195a).
35. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958), the land buyers
apparently did not demand any reduction in price for giving up their right to choose
between competing sources of transportation.
Judicial notions of the need to prevent transactions restricting future decisions may be
found in the earliest common-law restraint of trade cases prohibiting a man from selling
his right to participate in a given occupation.
Such contracts injure the parties making them .... They tempt improvident persons,
for the sake of present gain, to deprive themselves of the power to make future
acquisitions. And they expose such persons to imposition and oppression.
•.. They tend to deprive the public of the services of men in the employment and
capacities in which they may be most useful to the community as well as themselves,
Alger v. Thacker, 36 Mass. (19 Pick) 51, 54 (1837).
36. That this was the central rationale of International Salt is made dear by its state-
ment of the per se rule and its reliance on the Learned I-land opinion in Fashion
Originators. See p. 87 supra. See also Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99, 504, 508-09 (1969); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S, 88,
45, 49 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 US. 1, 6 (1958); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 US. 594, 605-06 (1952). For an explanation of the
Court's emphasis on foreclosure see Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws:
Of Economics, Populism and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. Rxv. 325, 332 (1968).
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as far as possible, yet lose sales because in a separate industry the
tying seller has been able to gain an advantage over his competitors.37
In order to protect himself, the tied-market seller must enter a new
business, which may require large outlays of capital and in which
he may not have developed expertise.
This foreclosure rationale applies to potential as well as existing
competitors. New entrants into either a marginal tied product market
or one in which a large portion of potential buyers have a need for
the tying as well as the tied product will face higher barriers to entry
than they would in the absence of the tie.B If the customers for both
products represent a significant segment of those the buyer would wish
to draw away from existing producers, he will have to develop two new
businesses instead of one.
The policy against foreclosure of existing and potential compet-
itors is not designed as part of a theory on the consumer welfare
effects of particular market structures. The Court is, rather, reacting
to the failure of economic theory to provide workable standards
for measuring such broad economic effects. Here, as in other areas
of antitrust, the Court is responding to economic indeterminacy
with "a method of analysis placing primary emphasis on equality
of opportunity, free access to markets by competitive sellers, and
complete freedom of choice by buyers."39 Tie-in law has developed
on quasi-tort lines to protect businessmen from what the Court con-
ceives as an unfair method of competition.
The Court's uniqueness test is adequate to identify a number of
situations in which this type of foreclosure is likely to occur. When-
37. If the larger companies have achieved economies of scale in their credit opera-
tions, they can of course exploit these economies legitimately by lowering their
credit charges to consumers who purchase credit only, but economies in financing
should not, any more than economies in other lines of business, be used to exert
economic power over other products that the company produces no more effidenly
than its competitors .... [T]ie-ins ... cripple other companies that are equally, if
not more, efficient in producing their own products.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 994 US. 495, 509 (196).
[Tying agreements] deny competitors access to the market for the tied product, not
because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better product or a lower
price but because of his power in another market.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). See also Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516-17 (1917).
38. This policy is not dearly enunciated in all the tying cases, but see Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969). Cf. FTC v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 261 US. 463, 466 (1923). KAYsEN & TuRNER, Azrmusr PoLicy 157 (1965),
seem to consider this as the most important policy involved in the tying prohibition.
39. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism
and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 332 (1968). See ]3ok, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 227-28, 241-44. 271-75
(1960). But see Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE LJ. 775 (1965).
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ever there are some buyers who find a seller's product uniquely attrac-
tive, and are therefore willing to pay a premium above the price of
its nearest substitute, the seller has the opportunity to impose a tie
to some other good. Even assuming that he changes the money price
of neither good, there will be some buyers of the tying good who
will refuse the package because they have no desire for the tied good.
But there will also be some buyers, who previously bought the tied
good from the seller's tied-market competitors, who will sacrifice
their tied good preference in order to obtain the seller's unique
tying product. These buyers are effectively denied to the tied product
competitor, and in order to regain them the competitor will have
to lower his price or offer some tying product equally attractive to
that of the tying sellers.40
The Court's per se rule against the use of a unique product in
tie-ins thus makes perfectly good sense if its purpose is to avoid fore-
closure. The rule identifies one set of situations in which foreclosure
is likely to result from the tie. A showing of market "dominance" or
"monopoly power" neither is nor should be required, since it is the
effect on particular customers which is important.
In terms of marginalist economic theory, the rule can be restated
as follows: whenever a seller faces a negative sloping demand curve
for his tying product, he can, even without altering his previous
prices for the separate goods, impose a tie and foreclose competitors.
The sloping demand curve represents the seller's ability to raise the
"price" of the tying product by imposing the sacrifice of preference,
yet still retain some customers. 41 Such a curve will exist whenever
the tying product is significantly "differentiated," 42 that is, when
through use of patents, trademarks, brand names, copyrights, adver-
tising, secret production techniques, or other variations which cannot
be freely reproduced, 43 the seller is able to convince some buyers
that there is no exact substitute for his product and so create buyer
loyalty within some price range.
Product differentiation, or "uniqueness," is thus an indication
that a tie-in is likely to produce foreclosure. However, as the follow-
40. But see p. 95 infra.
41. See JOE S. BAIN, PmcINc, DISRIUBuTION, AND EMPLOYMENT 131, 352-55 (rev. ed. 1953)
[hereinafter referred to as BAIN]; I.M. BOBER, INTERMEDIATE PRICE AND INCOME TIuEov
211, 269-70 (rev. ed. 1962) [hereinafter referred to as BOBER].
42. See BAIN 352-53; BOBER 269.
48. See BAIN 366-72; BOBER 265-70; E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY or MoNoPoLasrrI
COMPMrrMON 56-64 (8th ed. 1962) [hereinafter referred to as CHAMBERLIN]. Cf. Ozga,
Imperfect Markets Through Lack of Knowledge, 74 QuARTERLY J. ECON. 29, 47, 51 (1960).
Vol. 79: 86, 1969
The Logic of Foreclosure
ing marginal analysis should show, a theoretically more stringent
standard could be devised to show when a seller is in a position to
foreclose.
The seller of a differentiated product can always raise his price
and still retain some customers, but he may be prevented from doing
so by the fear that this would eventually cause new suppliers to enter
his market and take away his customers. Fairly close substitutes may
also be available from competitors already in operation, and buyers
may be likely to switch when his price gets "out of line" with the
competition. If entry is very easy and substitutes very close, the sel-
ler's price will be virtually fixed, and he will charge only that price
which yields sufficient profit to keep him from using his capital else-
where ("competitive profit").4 4 On the other hand, when barriers
to entry are significant and there are few substitutes, it will be possi-
ble for the seller to raise his price above the "competitive profit"
level and earn "monopoly profits." 45 How much he actually does
raise price will be limited first by the fact that at some point entry
will be feasible, and second by the extent to which higher prices force
some customers to accept substitute goods or forego purchase.
Supposing that monopoly profits are available, it will be possible
for the seller to take out his monopoly profits through a tie-in of
some other good. Rather than raising the cash price of the tying
product, and pocketing the profit, he can, in effect, use the profit as
a subsidy to the price of the tied product and foreclose tied market
competitors. He will do so, of course, only if the tied market sales
will more than compensate him (although perhaps only in the long
run) for his sacrifice of profit on the tying product.40
As the above analysis indicates, there are two levels of facts which
give increasing certainty that the tie results in foreclosure of tied
market competitors: differentiation in the tying product and presence
of monopoly profits in the tying market. Determination of the pres-
ence of monopoly profit presents severe problems of factual inquiry
-mostly relating to the degree and kind of oligopoly in the tying
44. BAxN 289-92, 335-39, 364; Bourn 273.
45. BArN 289-92, 332-39, 363-65; BouER 273; CiAmD.ER.IN 110-13; T. Scrwovsny, WvLAr E
AND CoMrrEMmoN 23 (1951).
46. The Court may safely assume that sellers will tie only when the practice is
profitable. It may well be, however, that the seller expects profits from the tie separate
from those gained by foreclosure. This, considered as a lack of intent, does not necessarily
reduce the likelihood that foreclosure will result. But such other profits may sometimes
indicate societally beneficial effects of the tie-in that outweigh the interest in protecting
competitors. See p. 101 infra. It also seems likely that intent to foreclose is not an
element of the illegality of tie-ins because it is so difficult to prove.
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market.47 An attempt to resolve these problems on a case-to-case basis
would lead to voluminous records and the most minute factual anal-
ysis, yet would probably result in decisions made on little more than
intuition.48 Given the low interest in protecting even non-foreclosing
tie-ins from the antitrust laws,49 the Court has not surprisingly chosen
to treat proof of monopoly profits as unnecessary when certain types of
product differentiation are present. Refusal to inquire into monopoly
profits is justified where the differentiating quality is (a) easily identi-
fiable, and (b) likely in a large number of situations to give rise to
monopoly profits. 0 The classes of product differentiation which thus
far have been held to meet these requirements are patents, 1 copy-
rights52 and the assumed uniqueness of land.53 Whether other differen-
tiations will give rise to similar per se rules is a question for developing
case law, but it would seem that trademarks 4 and physical product
differentiations of a type requiring long-range capital investments to
replicate5 should be given the same treatment.
The notion that foreclosure is at the root of tie-in law is supported
by Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,60 in which
the Supreme Court reversed a summary dismissal of an antitrust
treble damages suit. U.S. Steel Credit Corporation provided plaintiff
land developer with a two million dollar loan subject to a promise
to use 85% of that amount for the purchase and installation of U.S.
Steel's prefabricated homes. 7 Plaintiff asserted that the tie-in was
illegal and claimed damages based on profits lost due to the above-
market cost of the houses and their inferior quality. The lower court
47. See BArN 130 & n.1.
48. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARv. L. REV. 226, 227-28, 241-44, 271-75 (1960); Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the
Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism and Cynicism, 67 Mien. L, REV. 325, 330-32
(Dec. 1968).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 US. 38, 44 (1962), for a commoni ex.
pression of the low utility of tie-ins.
50. The degree of difficulty of proving monopoly profits arising from a particular type
of differentiation may influence the decision to avoid such proof. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), seems to present a type of tying product-'
loans--where the factors of production are simple enough to make a market power
inquiry relatively easy.
51. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
52. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 US. 38 (1962).
53. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
54. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 43, at 57-62.
55. See p. 99 infra. Since there will be a substantial time lag betwecn the Initial
monopoly profits and the entry of new producers in these cases, there will be substantial
foreclosure. Note also the Court's apparent willingness to forego proof of economic condi-
tions in "physical" barrier cases. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp,, 394
U.S. 495, 505 n.2 (1969).
56. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
57. Id. at 497.
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dismissed, partially on the ground that the credit's sole unique qual-
ity-that U.S. Steel agreed to loan an amount equal to 100% of the
developer's land as security-had been showrn uniquely attractive only
to the petitioner, and that no economic control or unique attractiveness
had been shown "with respect to buyers generally."59
The Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion
argues that the "sufficient economic control" which makes a tie-in
illegal may exist "only with respect to some of the buyers" in the
tied market; there need be no showing that buyers in the tying mar-
ket generally find the product uniquely attractive.0 This, of course,
is in line with the theory of foreclosure outlined above. As long as
some buyers find the tying product sufficiently attractive to warrant
accepting a sacrifice of preference in the tied market, tied market
sellers may be foreclosed. Having disposed of the lower court's argu-
ment, however, Black faced a further problem.
In previous cases the tying product's uniqueness-and hence its
utility in creating leverage-derived either from legal or from
physical limitations on its supply. If buyers were willing to pay a
premium (by sacrificing preference in the tied market) in order to
obtain International Salt's machines or Northern Pacific's land, it
was because it was simply impossible for them to obtain exactly
similar goods from competitors. In Fortner, however, the unique
attribute of the tying loan-100% coverage of the security-was, as
far as the Court could know, freely replicable by tying market com-
petitors.60 The only thing peculiarly attractive about U.S. Steel's offer
was the low price of the tying product compared with the price of an
identical product from other sources.61
Although this kind of "uniqueness" does not fall squarely within
the rule developed in International Salt, Northern Pacific and Loew's,
58. Id. at 499.
59. Id. at 503.
60. The Court twice recognized that part of the loan's uniqueness vms that it was
"cheap." 394 U.S. at 504-05.
61. Justice Black's opinion in Fortner can be read as considering the tying product
as differentiated but applying to it the "monopoly profits" test noted pp. 95-96 supra.
On the criteria suggested there, such a refusal to accept the per se product differentiation
rule would seem to be justified since the differentiation of 100% financing sems unlikely,
without more, to suggest monopoly profits. If Justice Black is follo ing this approach,
his inquiry into substantial cost differentials would be virtually identical to that
described pp. 98-99 infra because monopoly profits in differentiated product markets
may follow from significant cost advantages over potential new producers of the differ-
entiated product. See BoBER, supra note 41, at 273. However, it does seem correct to
regard, as the dissenters dearly do (see, e.g., 394 U.S. at 515), the product as undifferentiated
and apply the rule called forth by ananal)sis of undifferentiated markets. A difference
merely in price can indicate the possibility of foreclosure, but not because it necessarily
implies a sloping demand curve (as is the case in a truly differentiated product).
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it can also permit the tying seller to foreclose competitors in the tied
market. The Court correctly identified the situations where fore-
closure can result from a uniquely low price on an otherwise undif-
ferentiated product as those in which the tying seller has some cost
advantage over his tying market competitors. 2 Such a situation is
illustrated by the following hypothetical.
If some seller developed a process by which he-and he alone-
could produce flourO at one half its previous cost, and if he could
provide a sufficient quantity, he might choose to cut his price dras.
tically and dominate or monopolize the market. As an alternative,
say if his supply of flour were limited, he might supply less than the
whole market at the old price and collect the difference between his
cost and that of his competitors as extra profit. A third possibility
would be to supply less than the whole market, offering a low price,
but tying in some other profitable good. 4 The seller could thus
translate his cost advantage from the tying to the tied market and
foreclose competitors. The tied market competitor would be able
to offer an equivalent low price only by finding another industry in
which he could earn profit sufficient to subsidize the tied product
price to the same degree.
The cost advantages which permit the tying flour seller to foreclose
his competitors produce "economic rent." In its most general form,
economic rent arises whenever there are different costs for different
units of a resource 5 used in the production of a good for sale.00 In
any market, the same price will be paid for the same good, whatever
the conditions under which it was produced. This market price is
high enough to give a competitive profit to the least cost-efficient
62. 394 US. at 505-06 8: n.2. Since rortner involved a summary dismissal of an un-
developed complaint, the Court could only speculate as to the economics enjoyed by U.S.
Steel Credit Corporation. U.S. Steel extended credit secured by land in different areas of
the country and thus may have faced less risk of a decrease in the value of land in one area.
63. The Court's use of wheat as an illustration of an undifferentiated product per-
mitting the evils of the tie-in, 394 US. at 509, seems significant in view of its earlier use
of flour as the kind of undifferentiated product not coming within the pure uniqueness
rule. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 US. 1, 7 (1958).
64. See note 37 supra. No allegation is made here that he would necessarily derive any
greater value from his technological innovation than he would have gained by selling the
flour separately. But whatever the seller's motive, the tie is potentially harmful as a fore-
closing device.
65. "Resources" is used to refer to any element contributing to the price or cost of a
commodity. "Factor" is the more precise term of art.
66. The theory of differential rent was first put forth with respect to land by Adam
Smith and clarified by Ricardo. Marx and Marshall ("quasi-rent') extended the concept
to other resources. See E. RoLL, A HISTORy oF EcONO:ssc TnouciT 165.66, 183-87, 278.81,
400-01 (3d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as ROLL]. Cf. E. SToKEs, Tnr ENGLISH UT1ArALIANS
AN INDIA 87-89, 93 (1959).
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seller in the market. To the extent that any seller has costs of pro-
duction or sale below those of his least efficient stable competitor,
the difference in cost is rent.6 Differential rent will tend to increase
as less efficient, more costly resources and firms are drawn on to satisfy
an increasing demand.0 8 Rent will tend to decrease to zero as the
inefficient sellers or new entrants successfully adopt the more produc-
tive methods of the rent receivers.0 9 The surplus profit, or rent, uill
continue to exist only for the time period required for competitors
to change their production methods,70 unless, of course, the cost sav-
ing resource is in permanently short supply and new units can be
obtained only at higher cost.7 1 As long as the seller's cost advantage
exists, the resulting rent constitutes a pool from which he can draw
in order to subsidize the price of a tied product, and thereby foreclose
competitors.
Like the choice of "uniqueness" or a high degree of product differ-
entiation in the earlier cases, the choice of "significant cost advan-
tages" as a standard makes sense in undifferentiated product situations
because of the underlying policy against foreclosure. -2 There is noth-
ing in the Court's opinion to indicate that the economic rent need
be permanent. 3 Proof of defendant's cost advantages over the econo-
mist's "short range" ought to be enough to render a tie-in illegalJ 4
This is consistent with the Court's historical refusal to allow any
substantial foreclosure-the tied product competitor should not be
forced to wait for relief by way of problematic long-range changes
occurring in a market he cannot affect.
The significant cost advantage standard also resembles the earlier
choice of "uniqueness" in that it is not comprehensive: there may be
foreclosure by a seller of an undifferentiated tying product even when
all tying market sellers have identical costs. This will occur when the
67. This formulation is a derivation of that set out by ROLL at 278-79. That formula-
tion is altered slightly by the ideas of Ricardo, id. 183-87, and modem marginal anal)sis,
see notes 44-46 supra.
68. RoLL 166; J. ROBINSON, THE EcoNo.tcs OF IMrPErrrr CowP-nov 102-19 (194).
69. ROLL 279; note 45 supra.
70. See BOBER, note 41 supra, at 596.
71. ROLL 279; BOBER 395-96. See J. ROBINSON, THE EcONOMncS OF IMPERF.O COampr!-
TION 113 (1954).
72. See p. 96 supra.
73. The Court indicated in its discussion of "economic barriers," 994 US. at 505-06
& n.2, that the concerns that must be "barred" were the current competitors in the t)qing
market. If the Court had been willing to consider the lack of long-range cost advantages
as negating the necessary "suffident economic control," the position of potential entrants
would have to be examined.
74. The "short run" is roughly that period of time that clapses before sellers in a
market can effectuate changes in their capital plant. See BAw, supra note 41, at 90-91.
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number of sellers is sufficiently small and the barriers to entry suffi-
ciently great so that, by tacit agreement or conscious parallelism,
the sellers are able to raise price and obtain monopoly profits (mean-
ing, as before, profits greater than those necessary to keep them from
shifting their capital elsewhere).7" And wherever there are monopoly
profits, there is a fund from which the tied product price can be
subsidized.
One possibility in the identical cost oligopoly situation is for one
seller to set his price below that of the others and impose a tie. While
they take their monopoly profit in cash, he takes his in the form of
extra sales in the tied market. Another possibility is for all the oligop-
olists to impose a tie and attempt to transfer their joint power from
the tying to the tied market. The test for the possibility of foreclosure
here would have to be similar to that in the case of the differentiated
product not subject to a per se rule based on patents, brand names,
or the like. Unless the Court decides to use some indicator of monop-
oly profit short of a full scale market analysis, the trial court will have
to examine such factors as barriers to entry, past pricing policy, num-
ber of oligopolists, and conditions in related product markets.70
The logic of the Court's foreclosure doctrine has led from a rather
limited prohibition on tying with patented goods to a general theory
prohibiting tie-ins wherever there exists appreciable market power
over the tying product. The Court's rules make sense in terms of
economic analysis of the tie-in situation: where any degree of market
power over the tying product exists, foreclosure of tied market com-
petitors is possible. Uniqueness provides a convenient standard for iden-
tifying such situations. Where the uniqueness standard is not helpful,
the Court can use the "significant cost advantage" standard to identify
some of the situations in which monopoly profits in the tying mar-
ket make foreclosure potentially profitable. Where costs are similar,
an investigation of barriers to entry and market structure might be
used to locate a surplus available to subsidize the price of the tied
product. Experience with cases may produce rules by which this third
type of test for the foreclosure danger can be made less onerous than
it now appears.
It is true that tying arrangements may have economic effects other
than foreclosure. Prices, output, profits, market structure and, ulti.
75. See BAIN 273-96, 332-39.
76. See p. 96 supra.
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mately, consumer welfare will be affected, for good or ill, by the tie.77
As the Court begins to feel able to identify the factual situations in
which non-foreclosure effects are sufficiently beneficial to outwveigh
the harm to tied product competitors, it can make exceptions for those
situations within the existing framework. One such exception has
already emerged to allow infant industries to protect good will by
tying technologically interdependent goods and services.78 It has been
argued that significant cost advantages accrue from the tie-in and are
passed on to consumers.79 In the event that defendants are able to
come forward with proof of such advantages and to convince the
Court that they outweigh the evils of foreclosure, another exception
might be created. On the other hand, where the tie-in can be shown
to harm parties other than tied market competitors-as for example
consumers unable to make rational choices when confronted with
complex package deals-the Court may appropriately widen rather
than narrow the rule.
77. See Mfarkovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YAL.E L.J. 1397
(1967).
78. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd,
965 US. 567 (1961) (per curiam).
79. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE IJ. 19, 29
(1957). It should be noted that the cost advantage so justifying a foreclosure would have to
come not from lower cost of the package as opposed to the separate goods, but from
economies deriving from refusal to sell the tying good in addition to the package. It is
hard to imagine situations in which such economies would result.
